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Summary 
How should a decision-maker allocate R&D funds when a group of experts provides 
divergent estimates on a technology's potential effectiveness? To address this question, we 
propose a simple decision-theoretic framework that takes into account ambiguity over the 
aggregation of expert opinion and a decision-maker's attitude towards it. In line with the 
paper's focus on R&D investment, decision variables in our model may affect experts' 
subjective probability distributions of the future potential of a technology. Using results 
from convex optimization, we are able to establish a number of analytical results including a 
closed-form expression of our model's value function, as well as a thorough investigation of 
its differentiability properties. We apply our framework to original data from a recent expert 
elicitation survey on solar technology. The analysis suggests that more aggressive investment 
in solar technology R&D is likely to yield significant dividends even, or rather especially, after 
taking ambiguous aggregation into account. 
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Abstract
How should a decision-maker allocate R&D funds when a group of experts provides diver-
gent estimates on a technology's potential eectiveness? To address this question, we propose
a simple decision-theoretic framework that takes into account ambiguity over the aggregation
of expert opinion and a decision-maker's attitude towards it. In line with the paper's focus
on R&D investment, decision variables in our model may aect experts' subjective probability
distributions of the future potential of a technology. Using results from convex optimization,
we are able to establish a number of analytical results including a closed-form expression of our
model's value function, as well as a thorough investigation of its dierentiability properties. We
apply our framework to original data from a recent expert elicitation survey on solar technology.
The analysis suggests that more aggressive investment in solar technology R&D is likely to yield
signicant dividends even, or rather especially, after taking ambiguous aggregation into account.
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11 Introduction
Innovation is an uncertain process. The history of major R&D programs is paved with failures and
dead ends and, eventually, successes. Failures can derive from a funding tap closed too early, or
from the plain fact that a technology ultimately proves to be technically or economically infeasible.
High opportunity costs and scarce public funding imply that making decisions over competing R&D
programs is a delicate and considerably complex task. Importantly, it is a task that needs to take
into account uncertainty.
Addressing the uncertainty of R&D programs is complicated by the fact that probabilities of
success are very hard to estimate. They tend to be functions of R&D investment itself, and this
endogeneity adds formidable challenges to their econometric estimation. Nonetheless, there exists a
vast literature, studying patent numbers and/or productivity levels, that provides empirical support
to the idea of a positive and strong relationship between R&D funding and innovation (Grossman
and Helpman [19]). Of relevance to this paper's empirical exercise, such a connection has also been
observed in the specic case of energy R&D investment (Newell et al. [28], Popp [31]).
Although the positive relationship between R&D and technological breakthroughs is well es-
tablished, characterizing the probability of success given dierent levels of R&D expenditure is a
question that can only partially be addressed by past data. Historical information on costs, patents,
and R&D expenditure may be used to get an idea of the general trends, but research programs
dier vastly and are, most of the time, not reproducible. Therefore, to account for the uncer-
tainty of specic R&D programs it is often necessary to resort to expert judgments and subjective
probabilities.
Structured expert judgment, pioneered in the 1975 Rasmussen Report on nuclear power plant
safety, derives probabilistic input for decision problems through experts' quantication of their
subjective uncertainties (Morgan and Henrion [27], Cooke [13], O'Hagan et al. [29]). Experts'
probability distributions are elicited via transparent protocols and treated as scientic data. The
employed elicitation techniques involve recognizing and removing, as much as possible, known psy-
chological biases in judgment (Tversky and Kahneman [35]). They further incorporate consistency
checks and structure the variables to be estimated in such a way that experts are called to respond
to well-dened and clear questions. Expert elicitation surveys have been used in a wide variety of
applications, including energy innovation (Baker et al. [4, 5]), and we refer the reader to [27, 13, 29]
for a comprehensive account of this growing literature.
Despite its intuitive appeal, expert elicitation often generates widely-divergent opinions across
experts, implying fundamentally dierent and competing views. To come to grips with this com-
2plexity, researchers typically aggregate over expert estimates in some fashion and consider their
average. Indeed, there is a rich literature that studies the many dierent ways such aggregations
may be performed. In their general survey papers, Clemen and Winkler [11, 12] broadly distinguish
between (i) mathematical approaches and (ii) behavioral approaches. Mathematical aggregation
methods are primarily concerned with constructing a single probability distribution on the basis
of individual elicited distributions. This is usually pursued either through axiomatic treatments of
mathematical formulas of aggregation, or, where possible, through Bayesian statistical methods.
By contrast, behavioral approaches involve the direct interaction between experts in order to reach
consensus on a single \group" estimate. This interaction can be structured in a number of dierent
ways according to the application at hand.
We take a dierent approach to the ones outlined above. Motivated by contexts in which
Bayesian updating methods are not readily applicable1, we propose a modeling framework that is
inspired by the economic-theory literature on decision making under ambiguity and as such is not
concerned with determining a single probability distribution reecting expert opinion.2 In constrast
to the Bayesian setting, decision-theoretic models of ambiguity are designed to address situations
in which a decision maker is unable to posit precise probabilistic structure to physical and economic
phenomena. This framework derives from the concept of uncertainty as introduced by Knight [25]
to represent a situation in which a decision maker lacks adequate information to assign probabilities
to events. Ambiguity is contrasted to risk, which denes settings in which probabilistic structure
can be fully captured by a single Bayesian prior.
We now briey describe the mechanics of our model. In our setting, a decision maker elicits
the judgment of a set of experts on the eect of R&D investment on the future cost of a technology.
Levels of R&D investment aect the decision maker's problem in two ways: (a) they alter experts'
subjective probability distributions on the technology's future cost and (b) they are arguments of a
utility function that measures the technology's cost-eectiveness as a function of its future cost and
R&D expenditure. As an initial benchmark, our framework posits an equal-weight linear aggrega-
tion over experts' diverging probability distributions. Subsequently, it considers enlargements of
the set of possible aggregation schemes by parametrizing over their maximum distance, measured
via the L2 norm, with respect to the benchmark equal-weight aggregation. This distance is referred
to as aggregation ambiguity. Next, our model computes the best-and worst-case expected outcomes
of a given level of R&D investment, subject to the feasible set of distributions that is implied by
1Say, when a group of experts is interviewed a single time on the long-term potential of an untested technology.
Which matches perfectly our paper's empirical application (see Section 4).
2See Gilboa and Marinacci [17] for a comprehensive recent survey of this literature.
3assigned levels of aggregation ambiguity. Finally, we consider a convex combination of the best
and worst-case expected outcomes as a reasonable way to model decision makers' preferences under
aggregation ambiguity.
Our model nests in a parametric fashion simple averaging and best/worst-case analysis and
allows for an expression of decision-makers' beliefs regarding, and attitude towards, the underlying
uncertainty in expert aggregation. Its simple structure allows for precise analytical insights, and
we study its properties in depth. Using results from convex and conic optimization, we are able to
provide a closed-form expression for our value function and its derivative with respect to aggregation
ambiguity. These results enable sensitivity analysis across dierent levels of aggregation ambiguity
and ambiguity attitude. We proceed to investigate the value function's dierentiability in R&D
investment and, where applicable, provide a closed-form expression for this derivative. This can
subsequently be used to to obtain a necessary condition for optimal R&D investment. We conclude
the paper's theoretical section by arguing that, while non-dierentiability of the value function with
respect to investment is in principle possible, it is not likely to be often encountered in practice.
We now discuss our model's relation to the existing literature. Our framework is a variation of
the -maxmin model that has been studied extensively in the decision-theoretic literature beginning
with Hurwicz [20] and Arrow and Hurwicz [3]. Later contributions by Gilboa and Schmeidler [18]
(whose seminal paper dealt with the pure maxmin model), Ghirardato et al. [16], Chateaunauf et
al. [10], and Eichenberger et al. [14] focused on axiomatic treatments of similar models in which
a decision maker's actions are modeled by Savage acts [34], i.e. functions from a state space
to a space of consequences. Our work departs from these papers in a number of ways. First, the
decision variables in our model are not functions. Instead, they are real numbers, representing levels
of R&D investment, that enter the value function as arguments of (a) a utility function measuring
the technology's cost-eectiveness as well as (b) the set of priors that the decision-maker is taking
into account when performing his best- and worst-case analysis. This latter element of action-
dependent expert beliefs is non-standard in the decision-theoretic literature. It has been studied
in recent axiomatic work by Karni [23], who developed a Bayesian decision theory in which acts
inuence subjective beliefs. Other researchers have focused on generalizations of the Savage setting
along similar lines. Olszewski [30] studied the -maxmin model in a more abstract environment
in which a decision maker is called to choose over sets of lotteries (i.e., priors), while Viero [36]
axiomatized the -maxmin model in a setting in which acts map from states to sets of priors.
The model we propose in this paper combines features of [23, 30, 36] but diers in its explicit
treatment of aggregation ambiguity as a parameter input, as well as in its focus on the derivation and
4dierentiability of the value function.3 Correspondingly, the mathematical machinery we employ
is also quite dierent and, unlike the previously cited economic-theory literature, we do not pursue
an axiomatic characterization of preferences in our economic environment. As a result, we do
not assert the appeal of our value function on formal principles of rationality. Instead, we see
the primary virtues of our approach as being those of intuitiveness and practicality. Admitting
a closed-form solution and straightforward interpretation/calibration, our model aims to integrate
and operationalize the insights of the deeper contributions of the literature to the decision-making
process as it pertains to expert opinions over R&D budgets. Indeed, the model we propose is an
outgrowth of the need to develop a tractable theoretical framework to accommodate data from a
recent expert elicitation on solar-energy R&D (see paragraph below and Section 4).
We base the empirical analysis of our paper on original data from the ICARUS project (Bosetti
et al. [7]), a recent expert elicitation survey on the potential of R&D investment in alternative
energy technologies.4 As an initial step, we use the collected data of the survey to construct
experts' subjective probability distributions on the future cost of solar energy conditional on R&D
investment. Subsequently, we employ an integrated assessment model (Bosetti et al. [8]) to calculate
the benets of R&D investment (in the form of lower future solar-electricity costs) and use these
estimates to inform our assesment of the relevant R&D investment alternatives. The application
of our theoretical model to these data suggests that ambiguity plays an important role in assessing
the potential of solar technology. The policy implication we are able to cautiously draw is that
more aggressive investment in solar technology R&D is likely to yield signicant dividends, even
(or perhaps especially) after taking ambiguity into account.
Paper outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the decision-
theoretic model, while Section 3 analyzes its theoretical properties. Section 4 illustrates the the-
oretical results with original data from a recent expert elicitation on solar technology. Section
5 provides concluding remarks. All mathematical proofs, tables, gures, as well as non-essential
supplementary information are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model Description
Consider a set N of experts indexed by n = 1;2;:::;N. R&D investment is denoted by a variable
r 2 R and the technology's cost by c 2 C, where R and C are subsets of real numbers. An expert
3We elaborate further on the relevant literature and its relation to our work after we have formally dened the
model in Section 2.
4For more information see www.icarus-project.org.
5n's probability distribution of the future cost of technology given investment r is captured by a
random variable Cn(r) having a probability distribution function
n(cjr): (1)
Note that the decision variables of our model (R&D investment) directly aect experts' subjective
probability distributions of the technology's cost. This means that our setting is not amenable to
standard decision-theoretic frameworks going back to Savage [34].
Expert beliefs over the economic potential of R&D investment may, and usually do, vary
signicantly. The question thus naturally arises: How do we make sense of this divergence when
studying optimal R&D investment? In the absence of data that could lend greater credibility to
one expert over another and form the basis of a Bayesian analysis, one straightforward way would
be to simply aggregate over all pdfs n as given by Eq. (1), so that we obtain an \aggregate" joint







This approach inherently assumes that each and every expert is equally likely to represent reality,
and makes use of simple linear aggregation. While this is standard practice in the applied expert
elicitation literature, a great deal of information may be lost in such an averaging-out process,
especially when there are huge dierences among experts.
We thus move beyond simple averaging. In our framework each expert n's pdf n(cjr) is
weighted by the decision maker through a second-order probability pn. The set of admissible
second-order distributions p depends on the amount of ambiguity the decision maker is willing to
take into account when aggregating across experts, and in particular on how \far" he is prepared to
stray from equal-weight aggregation. Specically, we consider the set of second-order distributions






















Here, the set P(b) captures the uncertainty of the decision-maker's aggregation protocol. Thus,
we refer to parameter b it as aggregation ambiguity. Letting eN denote a unit vector of dimension
N, we see that distributions p belonging to P(b) satisfy jjp   eN
N jj2 
p
b, where jj  jj2 denotes
the L2-norm. Setting b = 0 implies complete certainty and adoption of the equal-weight singleton,
while b = N 1
N complete ambiguity over the set of all possible second-order distributions.5
5The latter statement holds in light of the fact that values of b >
N 1
N cannot enlarge the feasible set. This is
6We briey provide a potential interpretation of an ambiguity level b in our model. Consider
the benchmark equal-weight distribution 1
N eN. Now take a set of experts c N of cardinality b N and
begin increasing the collective second-order probability attached to their pdfs. The convex structure
of the feasible set P(b) enables us to provide a tight upper bound on the maximum second-order
probability p(b; b N;N) that can be placed on this set of experts, as a function of b and b N:

























To provide a sense of the above formula, let us focus on singleton sets so that b N = 1. Increasing b
from zero to 0.1 mean that the maximum second-order probability that can be assigned to a single
agent is 0.48, 0.4, and 0.35 for N = 5;10; and 20 experts, respectively.
Weighting the expert pdfs (1) under all aggregation schemes belonging in P(b) induces the




pn(b)n(jr) : p 2 P(b)
)
(5)
governing the future cost of the technology conditional on R&D investment r. Thus, holding r xed,
an increase in b implies an expansion of the set of priors a decision maker is willing to consider.
Dene the real-valued function
u(c;r) : C  R 7! <;
as representing the utility of R&D investment r, under cost realization c. Now, given investment
r, utility u, and the set of second-order distributions P(b) introduced in (3), we can calculate the
best- and worst-case expected outcomes associated with r, given aggregation ambiguity b. This
provides a measure of the spread, as measured by utility u, between the worst and best-cases, given
a \willingness" to stray from the benchmark equal-weight distribution that is constrained by b.











Plotting functions (6) and (7) over b 2 [0;(N 1)=N] gives decision makers a comprehensive picture
of the eectiveness of R&D investment r (as measured by utility u).








over the set of probability vectors concentrate all probability mass on














7The functions (6)-(7) x a level of aggregation ambiguity b and subsequently focus on the best
and worst cases. As such they capture extreme attitudes towards uncertainty in aggregation. To
express more nuanced decision-maker preferences we consider the following value function
V (rjb;) =   Vmin(rjb) + (1   )  Vmax(rjb)  2 [0;1]; (8)
representing a convex combination of the worst- and best-cases. The parameter  above captures
the decision maker's ambiguity attitude. It measures his degree of pessimism given aggregation
ambiguity b: the greater (smaller)  is, the more (less) weight is placed on the worst-case scenario.
Given values for b and , Eq. (8) operates as an objective function when searching for optimal
investment decisions r.
Relation to the literature. As mentioned in the introduction, the above framework is a varia-
tion of the -maxmin model that has been studied extensively in the decision-theoretic literature
beginning with Hurwicz [20] and Arrow and Hurwicz [3]. Later contributions by Gilboa and Schmei-
dler [18], Ghirardato et al. [16], Chateaunauf et al. [10], and Eichenberger et al. [14] focused on
axiomatic treatments of similar models in which a decision maker's actions are modeled by Savage
acts [34], i.e. functions from a state space to a space of consequences. In these models (as in most
of the relevant literature) acts enter into the value function only as arguments of the utility function
u, and have no eect on the set of priors that characterize the model's ambiguity. By contrast,
our model does not introduce the notion of a state space, and its decision variables (R&D invest-
ment) are real numbers, not functions. Moreover, a decision variable r enters the value function
both as an argument of the utility function u(c;r) as well as on the set of priors (b;r) that the
decision-maker will be taking into account when he conducts his best- and worst-case analysis given
aggregation ambiguity b. The latter dependency is non-standard. Jaray [22] had rst introduced
a similar notion with a decision-theoretic model based on non-additive belief functions, while later
Ghirardato [15] analyzed a model in which acts map from states to sets of consequences. More
recently, Olszewski [30] studied the -maxmin model in a related setting in which decision makers
are called to choose between sets of lotteries over which the maximum and the minimum payos
are subsequently computed. Moreover, Viero [36] axiomatized the -maxmin model in a setting in
which acts map from states to sets of lotteries, and thus can be viewed as a generalization of the
model of Olszewski. Ahn [1] adopted a similar environment to Olszewski, but the decision maker in
his model has preferences that incorporate aversion to ambiguity in a manner similar to the smooth
ambiguity model of Klibano et al. [24]. All of the above papers focus on settings that are consider-
ably more abstract to ours, and do not easily lend themselves to the kind of optimization-centered
8analysis we pursue. Of greater resemblance to this work, Karni [23] proposed a Bayesian model
with action-dependent subjective probabilities similar to Eq. (1). However, Karni was primarily
interested in providing an axiomatic characterization of his model and did not consider extending
it to a multiple-prior setting. An additional dierence of our framework with respect to all of the
above is its specic consideration of aggregation ambiguity through sets P(b) and (b;r). Searching
for the maximum and minimum payo of an investment subject to an aggregation ambiguity b is
reminiscent, at least in spirit, to the quantile-maximization model of Rostek [33].
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we focus on the optimization problems (6) and (7) and analyze the behavior of
value function V (rjb;), as we vary ambiguity levels b and R&D investment r. Using results from
convex optimization we are able to derive closed-form expression for this function and establish
its dierentiability in b (almost everywhere). To the best of our knowledge these results are novel,
as are the proof techniques we employ. Dierentiablity with respect to r is more subtle and we
use the results of Milgrom and Segal [26] to provide ranges of b and  for which it holds. Where























Eqs. (9) and (10) are valid by the linearity of the expectation operator. Optimization problems (9)
and (10) are convex programs with a simple structure and thus amenable to rich analysis. We
begin by proving that their optimal cost functions are continuous, monotonic, and concave/convex
in b.
Proposition 1 Fix r 2 R. The function Vmax(r;b) (Vmin(r;b)) dened in Eq. (9) (Eq. 10) is
increasing (decreasing) and concave (convex) in b. Both functions are continuous in b.
Before we state our next result we need to introduce additional notation. First, let Nk(r) denote
the set of experts sharing the k'th order statistic of fu1(r);u2(r);:::;uN(r)g. There are a total of
N(r) such sets where, depending on the problem instance, N(r) can be any number in f1;2;:::;Ng,
6While b is a parameter, we will abuse notation and, where convenient, consider it a variable.
9and we dene Nk(r) = jNk(r)j. Furthermore, let N +
k (r) =
SN
















. Our model structure enables us to easily show the following
Lemma.







N. Vmax(r;b) is strictly increasing in b 2 [0;b
max(r)]
and equal to maxn2N un(r) in b 2 [b
max(r); N 1
N ]. Vmin(r;b) is strictly decreasing in b 2 [0;b
min(r)]
and equal to minn2N un(r) in b 2 [b
min(r); N 1
N ].
Lemma 1 suggests that b
max(r) and b
min(r) are important thresholds. They represent the level
of aggregation ambiguity above which the set P(b) allows for the maximum (minimum) expert
estimate to be attained as an objective function value of (9) ((10)). Our next result establishes
that for levels of ambiguity smaller than these extreme values, the optimal solutions of problems (9)
and (10) will be unique and bind the quadratic ambiguity constraint associated with set P(b).
Proposition 2 Fix r 2 R. Suppose b 2 [0;b
max(r)] and consider the maximization problem (9).
There exists a unique optimal solution pmax(r;b) and it must satisfy the quadratic constraint of
set (3) with equality. For b 2 (b
max(r); N 1
N ] all probability vectors pmax(r;b) satisfying pmax
n (r;b) =











N2 will be optimal solutions of (9).
Analogous results apply to the minimization problem (10).
We are now ready to prove the paper's rst main result. Theorem 1 establishes that functions








min(r) respectively. Moreover, it formalizes a straightforward monotonicity
property of the optimal solutions of (9) and (10) that is essential to the derivation of the value
function pursued in Theorem 2. In proving Theorem 1 we make extensive use of results from conic
optimization, in particular the duality theory of second-order cone programming (see Alizadeh and
Goldfarb [2]).
Theorem 1 Fix r 2 R.








(b) Let pmax(r;b) (pmin(r;b)) denote an optimal solution of Vmax(r;b)(Vmin(r;b)). The following







n (r;b) = 0 8n 2 N  
k (r)
o









n (r;b) = 0; 8n 2 N +
N(r) k+1(r)
o
, b  ~ b

; (12)
10where k 2 f1;2;:::;N(r)   1g, are well-dened and strictly increasing in k.
Part (b) of Theorem 1 implies that bmax
k (r) and bmin
k (r) can be interpreted in the following way.
In the case of problem (9), bmax
k (r) denotes the minimum level of ambiguity such that for all
b  bmax
k (r) no probability mass is ever allocated to experts having an un(r) that is less than or
equal to the k'th order statistic of fu1(r);u2(r);:::;uN(r)g. Conversely, in the case of problem (10),
bmin
k (r) denotes the minimum level of ambiguity such that for all b  bmin
k (r) no probability
mass is allocated to experts having an un(r) that is greater than or equal to the (N(r)   k + 1)'th
order statistic of fu1(r);u2(r);:::;uN(r)g. While the existence and monotonicity of these ambiguity
thresholds is intuitively clear, their proofs are relatively involved.
Having established the dierentiability with respect to b of Vmax(r;b) and Vmin(r;b), we go on
to provide a set of dierential equations that they must satisfy. These dierential equations will
prove valuable in the subsequent derivation of Vmax and Vmin.
Proposition 3 Fix r 2 R and let pmax(r;b) denote the unique optimal solution of maximization
problem (9) as a function of b 2 [0;b
max(r)]. Suppose expert nk satises nk 2 Nk(r). Consider
bmax












= unk(r)   Vmax(r;b); b 2 (0;bmax
k (r)): (13)
Analogous results apply for the minimization problem (10) and Vmin(r;b).
Before presenting the paper's second main result, let u(k)(r) denote the k'th order statistic
of fu1(r);u2(r);:::;uN(r)g, where k = 1;2;:::;N(r). Now, dene the following quantities (where
uN(r)+1(r)+ = u 














; b uk(r)  = u(k)(r)   uk 1(r) ; k = 1;2;:::;N(r): (15)
The term uk(r)+ (uk(r) ) is simply an average of the values of the set fu1(r);u2(r);:::;uN(r)g that
are greater (smaller) than or equal to its k'th order statistic. The term b uk(r)+ (b uk(r) ) captures
the distance between the k'th order statistic and the average of the un(r)'s that are strictly greater
(smaller) than it.
Now, we dene the following quantities that play an important role for functions Vmax(r;b)
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(Clearly, the rst two expressions of Eqs. (16) and (17) are applicable only if N(r)  3.)
We are now ready to state our second main result and provide a closed-form expression for
Vmax(r;b) and Vmin(r;b), and therefore the value function (8).








dened in Eqs. (16) and (17). The vectors b+(r) and b (r) satisfy
b+
k (r) = bmax
k (r) k 2 f1;2;:::;N(r)   1g
b 
k (r) = bmin
k (r) k 2 f1;2;:::;N(r)   1g;
where bmax
k (r) and bmin
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; k = 2;3;:::;N(r)   1
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; k = 2;:::;N(r)   1








Theorem 2 shows that, keeping r xed, Vmax(r;b) and Vmin(r;b) will be concatenations of
approriately-specied square-root-like functions.7 These concatenations occur at levels of ambigu-
7These results are consistent with the more general analysis of Section 4.2 in Iyengar [21]. However, Iyengar uses
dierent arguments and does not prove dierentiability in b, nor does he derive and interpret formulas for Vmax and
Vmin and their optimal solutions p
max, p
min (we provide the latter in Corollary 1). Instead, his analysis is concerned
with determining complexity bounds for the computation of the optimal cost of (10).
12ity bmax;bmin which are interpreted by Eqs. (11)-(12), and can be computed explicitly through
Eqs. (16) and (17). The curvature of these functions is driven by the dispersion of experts' expected
estimates, as captured by the quantities (b uk(r)+; b uk(r) ) of Eqs. (14) and (15). Plotting functions





provides a concise visualization of
expert beliefs on the eect of an investment r.
We verify and illustrate Theorem 2 for the simple case in which N(r) = 2. We focus on Vmax
as the argument for Vmin is analogous. That Vmax(r;b) = maxn2N un(r) for b  b
max(r) follows by
Lemma 1 so we proceed by considering b 2 [0;b
max(r)). In this case, by rst principles it is easy
to see that the optimal solution of (9) will increase the probability share of all experts n 2 N2(r)
by an equal amount , which in turn will be oset by a uniform decrease in the probability shares



















































b; b 2 [0;b
max(r)): (18)
Note that Vmax's kink at b = b
max is veried through rst principles.




































b; b 2 [0;b
max(r));
which is consistent with Eq. (18).
We can now integrate the various results we have established to characterize the optimal
solutions of (9) and (10).





. Propositions 2 and 3 and Theorems 1 and 2 allow
us to explicitly characterize the sets of optimal solutions Pmax(r;b) and Pmin(r;b) of optimization
problems (9) and (10) respectively. Refer to the Appendix for the an explicit expression of these
sets.
13Corollary 1 provides succinct expressions for the optimal expert probabilities given investment
r and aggregation ambiguity b.
We now shift the focus of our analysis to investigate the dierentiability of value function
V (rjb;), given by Eq. (8), with respect to r.8 Here, the picture is considerably more subtle. We
use the results of Milgrom and Segal [26] to state the following Theorem.





and  2 [0;1] and consider the value function V (rjb;) given by
Eq. (8). Assume R = [rm;rM]  < and that the functions un(r) are continuously dierentiable on
R for all n 2 N. Let Pmax(r;b) and Pmin(r;b) denote the sets of optimal solutions of problems (9)
and (10) respectively, as given by Corollary 1. The function V (jb;) : R ! < is dierentiable at









































for all pairs of optimal pmin(r0;b) 2 Pmin(r0;b) and pmax(r0;b) 2 Pmax(r0;b).
Theorem 3 in combination with Proposition 2 allows us to establish the dierentiability of the
value function V (rjb;) at a point r = r0 for a range of b and .
Corollary 2 Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 3 hold. The function V (jb;) : R ! < is dif-





if  < 1 and N 1
N otherwise and b
min(rj) = b
min(r) if  > 0 and N 1
N otherwise. The derivative
is given by Eq. (19) where pmax(r0;b) and pmin(r0;b) are uniquely dened by Corollary 1.
Conversely, Theorem 3 also suggests that it is likely for the function V (rjb;) to be non-
dierentiable at a value r0 for a nontrivial range of b and . This non-dierentiability is due to the
fact that for b > b
max(r0) (b





admits multiple optimal solutions. For this reason, a derivative at r = r0 will generally fail to exist.
Proposition 4 formalizes this observation.
Proposition 4 Suppose the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and consider r0 2 (rm;rM).
8We now return to considering b as a parameter of the value function.




dr (r0) and n1;n2 2 N1(r0)
(NN(r0)(r0)). Then the function Vmin(rjb) (Vmax(rjb)) is not dierentiable at r = r0 for all
b > b
min(r0) (b > b
max(r0)).




dr (r0) such that
n1;n2 2 N1(r0) then the function V (rjb;) is not dierentiable at r = r0 for all b > b
min(r0).




dr (r0) such that n3;n4 2 NN(r0)(r0)
then the function V (rjb;) is not dierentiable at r = r0 for all b > b
max(r0).
In instances described by Proposition 4, it is clear that one cannot use rst-order conditions
to establish the potential optimality of an R&D investment r0. This non-dierentiability is an
unsatisfying, though not entirely unexpected, consequence of the maxmin nature of our model.
It stems from the fact that beyond a certain level of aggregation ambiguity there may exist a
multiplicity of aggregation schemes that yield the absolute maximum and minimum payos. In
the remainder of this section, we suggest that such non-smoothness issues may be, to a signicant
degree, mitigated.
Remark 1. Given Corollary 2 and Proposition 4, we would like to narrow the range of b and
 over which V (rjb;) would fail to be dierentiable. For this purpose, we provide a plausible
lower bound on problematic ranges of b with the following informal argument. Consider carefully
the continuously dierentiable functions un(r) =
R
c2C u(c;r)dn(cjr). Since subjective probability
distributions will generally dier across experts, then, assuming the domain C is moderately large,
it is unlikely that at any point r0 we will have more than 2 experts sharing the same value,
including the maximum and minimum values of fu1(r0);u2(r0);:::;uN(r0)g. Therefore, it is likely















so that Corollary 2 implies that V (jb;) will be, at the very least, everywhere dierentiable for
any choice of  2 [0;1] and b  N 2
2N . If we assume that decision makers are constrained in their
maximal choice of b (say, because equal-weight aggregation is deemed \fair" and/or to ensure that
no single group of experts is given too much weight) then potentially problematic ranges of b  N 2
N
are less likely to be considered and the negative result of Proposition 4 loses its bite.
Related to the above, Corollary 2 implies the dientiability of V (jb;) at all r0 2 (rm;rM),
for all b and , for an important special case: that in which there exists a pair of experts that are
15consistently the most optimistic and pessimistic across all levels of R&D. If surveyed experts have
dierent backgrounds, such consistently optimistic and pessimistic biases may well occur.
Corollary 3 Suppose the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and there exist two experts n1 and n2 such
that un1(r) > un(r) for all n 6= n1 and un2(r) < un(r) for all n 6= n2, for all r 2 R. In other
words, experts n1 and n2 are consistently the most optimistic and pessimistic across all levels of
R&D. Then Theorem 3 implies that V (rjb;) is dierentiable at all r0 2 (rm;rM) for all choices
of b and , with its derivative given by Eq. (19).
Hence, for problem instances satisfying the conditions of Corollary 3, rst-order conditions
given by Eq. (19) may be always invoked to solve for the maximizer of the value function V (rjb;),
regardless of the values of b and .
Remark 2. Finally, if our problem instance is such that Remark 1 and Corollary 3 are not
applicable, we may always address the potential non-dierentiability of the value function (8) by
slightly perturbing the un(r) functions so that for all r 2 R we have N1(r) = NN(r)(r) = 1. Since
the un(r) functions are assumed to be continuously dierentiable, such small perturbations would
be, at least in our view, defensible.
4 Empirical Application to Solar-Technology R&D
We base the empirical application of our paper to original data collected by the ICARUS survey,
an expert elicitation on the potential of solar technologies. During the course of 2010-2011, the
ICARUS survey collected expert judgments on future costs and technological barriers of dierent
Photovoltaic (PV) and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) technologies.9 Sixteen leading European
experts from academia, the private sector, and international institutions took part in the survey.
The elicitation collected probabilistic information on (1) the year-2030 expected cost of the tech-
nologies; (2) the role of public European Union R&D investments in aecting those costs; and (3)
the potential for the deployment of these technologies (both in OECD and non-OECD countries).
We refer readers interested in the general ndings of the survey to Bosetti et al. [7] and we focus
here on the data on future costs as they form the basis of our analysis.
Current 5-year EU R&D investment in solar technology is estimated at 165 million US dollars.
The ICARUS study elicited the probabilistic estimates of the 16 experts on the 2030 solar electricity
9The survey is part of a 3-year ERC-funded project on innovation in carbon-free technologies (ICARUS - Innovation
for Climate chAnge mitigation: a study of energy R&D, its Uncertain eectiveness and Spillovers www.icarus-
project.org).
16cost (2005 c$/kWh) under three future Scenarios: (1) keeping current levels of R&D constant until
2030, (2) increasing them by 50%, and (3) increasing them by 100%. Coherent responses were
obtained from 14 out of the 16 experts so the analysis that follows focuses solely on them. We used
linear interpolation of the survey's collected data (generally 3-6 points of each expert's cumulative
distribution function(cdf) conditional on R&D investment) to compute a pdf for each expert n 2
f1;2;:::;14g, given the three relevant levels of R&D investment denoted by r 2 fr1;r2;r3g (here
ri refers to Scenario i).10 These pdfs represent experts' subjective probability distributions of the
cost of technology as denoted in Eq. (1). Figure 1 plots the corresponding cdfs as well as the cdf
that the aggregate pdf (2) leads to, under all three Scenarios.
[FIGURE 1 here]
As one can see in Figure 1 there is considerable disagreement between experts over the potential
of solar technology. This disagreement is particularly acute under Scenario 1, and diminishes
as R&D levels increase. Nonetheless, the breakthrough nature of innovation and the need to
cross certain rm cost thresholds, means that ambiguity in expert estimates remains an important
concern, even under Scenario 3. This will become apparent in the analysis to follow.
We measure the utility of an investment via its net payo. Denoting the benet associated to
a technology cost c by the function B(c) and the opportunity cost of an investment r by O(r), this
is given by the following utility function:
u(c;r) = B(c)   O(r): (20)
The next section describes how we provide numerical values for B() and O().
Quantifying benets and opportunity costs of solar technology R&D. Expected benets
of solar technology R&D investments are quantied via a general equilibrium intertemporal model
that can account for a range of macro-economic feedbacks and interactions. These include the eects
of energy and climate change policies, the competition for innovation resources with other power
technologies, the eect of growth, as well as a number of other factors.11 To capture the long-term
nature of such investments, the integrated assessment model is run over the time horizon 2105-2100
in 5-year time periods for the whole range of exogenously-imposed possible 2030-costs of solar power
10Please refer to section A2 of the Appendix for more information on how expert pdfs were constructed from the
survey data.
11The analysis is carried out using the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model (Bosetti et al. [8]),
an energy-economy-climate model that has been used extensively for economic analysis of climate change policies.
See www.witchmodel.org for a list of applications and papers.
17that we are considering. Subsequently, simulation results are compared to the benchmark case in
which the cost of solar power is so high that the technology is not competitive with alternative
production modes. For each possible 2030 solar-power cost, the benet to the European Union is
quantied by the discounted EU-consumption improvement over the entire time-horizon 2005-2100
with respect to the case where solar technology is not competitive. Table 1 summarizes the results.
[TABLE 1 here]
Three important assumptions are at the basis of the numbers reported in Table 1. First, as the
survey concentrated on public EU R&D investment and the eects of increasing it, we disregard
spillovers and technological transfers to the rest of the world and consider only the consumption
improvement for Europe. Second, we evaluate the benet of alternative 2030 costs of solar power
assuming that no carbon policy is in place and that no special constraints on other technologies
are imposed (e.g., a partial ban on nuclear technology). Third, we discount cash ows using a 3%
discount rate. Although our choice is well in the range of discount rates adopted for large scale
public projects, it is important to note that the cost threshold for positive payos is robust for
a wide range of more myopic discount rate values. Our assumptions all err on the side of being
conservative about the potential payos of solar-technology R&D.
We now explain how we calculate the costs of solar R&D investment. Given an R&D investment
r, we assume that actual R&D spending is xed at r during the period 2005-2030, in line with the
survey questions. After 2030 we assume that spending drops to half its initial value, i.e. r=2,
and remains at that level until 2100. This drop occurs because we assume that post-2030 funds
represent the government's commitment to maintain the technological gains achieved by 2030. We
now derive the discounted opportunity cost of such expenditure streams of solar-technology R&D
spending. In doing so we follow Popp [32] and assume that, at every time period, this opportunity
cost is equal to 4 times the original investment. Thus, in our model the opportunity cost of a level
of R&D investment r is given by the net present value of the stream O(t) where O(t) = 4  r for
t = 1;2;:::;6 and 2r for t = 7;8;:::;20 (once again we use a 3% discount rate). Table 2 summarizes
these results for the three R&D Scenarios that the ICARUS survey focused on.
[TABLE 2 here]
Application of the decision-theoretic framework. We now extend our analysis to explicitly
account for aggregation ambiguity and adopt the decision-theoretic model introduced in Section
2.12 Our objective is to compare the three R&D Scenarios, and we do not consider optimizing over
12All simulations are performed in Mathematica.
18a continuous R&D domain R. We make this choice primarily because we wish to keep the applied
section brief and pursue more in-depth empirical analysis in future work.13













 [0;:96] for the three Scenarios.
The parametrization b2 is adopted since it allows us to (a) dampen the curvature of the original
functions as given by Theorem 2 and (b) interpret the parameter b as a bound on the Euclidean
distance of admissible aggregation schemes with respect to the benchmark equal-weight aggregation.
[FIGURE 2 here]
Focusing rst on Scenario 1, we note that pure aggregation of expert opinion (corresponding to
b = 0) yields a payo of approximately $1:36109. We observe that the worst-case payo drops to
about $ 3:4109 at b  :25 at which point it largely stops being sensitive to changes in b, slowly
asymptoting to its minimum value of $ 3:67109; in contrast, the best-case one increases steadily
to a maximum value of $22:7  109 at the maximum level of b = :96. Under Scenario 2, the payo
under zero ambiguity is equal to $7:8  109. Subequently, we see that the worst-case payo drops
to 0 at b = 0:15, at which point it keeps decreasing at a smaller rate until it practically reaches its
minimum value of $   5:5  109 at b  :55. Conversely, the best-case payo rises steadily to about
$32  109 for b  :55 at which point it continues to rise at a much smaller rate until it reaches a
maximum value of $33:3  109 at b = :96. Thus for Scenario 2, aggregation uncertainty becomes
largely unimportant once b reaches the threshold of 0.55. Under Scenario 3 the unambiguous payo
is around $20  109, signicantly higher than both other Scenarios. The worst-case payo drops
relatively smoothly to a minimum value of $   7:35  109 for b = :96, while the best-case one rises
at a comparatively higher rate to $70:9  109.
It is clear that aggregation ambiguity is important under Scenario 3, for both the worst- and
best-case payos, signicantly more so than under Scenarios 1 and 2. This fact is interesting in
light of Figure 1, which shows that experts' pdfs are much more dispersed under Scenarios 1 and 2
than they are under 3. The reason behind this seemingly unexpected result is straightforward. As
Table 1 suggests, expected payos of R&D investment are very sensitive at low cost values, i.e., less
than 8c$/kWh. The more aggressive investment of Scenario 3 has a greater eect on these lower
cost values, and therefore its best- and worst-case payos are in turn more sensitive to changes in
b.
We now consider the eect of ambiguity attitude on the decision maker's problem. Figure




given by Eq. (8) for all three investment Scenarios, over
13Indeed, constructing plausible approximations of experts' un(r) functions over an interesting range of r will likely
require further engagement with the experts.
19all levels of aggregation ambiguity and a decision-maker's attitude toward it. This allows policy
makers to visualize the eects of the three R&D investment decisions over the entire range of
possible ambiguity levels and ambiguity attitudes. As we expect from Figure 2, Scenario 3 fares
much better than both 1 and 2 over a very wide range of b and , and is much more sensitive to
changes in both.
[FIGURE 3 here]
Figure 4 goes a step further and compares the three R&D Scenarios for all possible combinations
of b and . Following the color scheme of Figure 2, a region's color corresponds to the Scenario that
performs the best within it, while the bold numbers within regions denote the relative order of the
three Scenarios within this range of (b;) (e.g., an expression \321" means Scenario 2 dominates
1, and Scenario 3 dominates both 2 and 1).
[FIGURE 4 here]
Figure 4 makes clear that Scenario 3 dominates 1 and 2 for an extremely wide range of com-
binations of b and . Conversely, Scenario 1 is the best option for a combination of very high b
and . Somewhat surprisingly, we see that Scenario 2 is dominated by either 1 or 3 for all possible
combinations of b and  and thus will never be chosen by a decision maker whose preferences
are captured by Eq. (8). Thus, on the basis of the presented data, it is clear that policy makers
should opt for the most aggressive R&D investment, unless they are both (a) open to ignoring
a very large set of surveyed experts (b) extremely concerned about the possibility of worst-case
failure. Moreover, assuming all three options are readily implementable, they can safely disregard
the middle-range R&D investment implied by Scenario 2.
5 Conclusion
Determining the optimal portfolio of government R&D is an important task, especially at times of
public funding scarcity. As R&D programs imply uncertain returns, it is important to assess these
investments using probabilistic tools. Expert elicitation surveys can play an important role in this
process if used to capture in a transparent and objective way subjective probabilities that can be
used as scientic data.
Yet, gathered information can vary substantially across experts. In particular, if the elicitation
is designed correctly is should exactly aim at covering all prevailing \visions" about that specic
technology. The dierent backgrounds and perspectives that experts bring to the elicitation process
20imply that collected subjective probability distributions will, more often than not, span a wide and
potentially confusing spectrum.
Condensing all of the problem's uncertainty into one single average probability distribution,
especially in cases where Bayesian methods cannot be readily applied, may conceal important
imformation and yield policy recommendations that are not robust. To deal with this issue, we
proposed and analyzed a novel decision-theoretic framework inspired by the well-studied -maxmin
model. In line with the paper's focus on R&D investment, decision variables in our model aect
experts' subjective probability distributions of the future potential of a technology. We applied our
framework to original data from a recent expert elicitation survey on solar technology. The analysis
suggested that more aggressive investment in solar technology R&D is likely to yield substantial
benets even after ambiguity over expert opinion has been taken into account.
We conclude by noting that while this paper has been motivated by the issue of R&D allocation,




To ease notation, in our proofs we suppress dependence on R&D investment r except where neces-
sary.
Proposition 1. We prove the Proposition for Vmax(b) (the argument for Vmin(b) is analogous).
That Vmax(b) is increasing in b follows by denition. Consider the optimization problems given by
the right-hand-side of Eq. (9) for b1 2 [0; N 1
N ] and b2  b1 and denote their optimal solutions by


























To prove concavity of Vmax in b it suces to show that
Vmax(b())  Vmax(b1) + (1   )Vmax(b2):
To this end, consider the probability vector given by
p() = pmax(b1) + (1   )pmax(b2):
By feasibility of pmax(b1) and pmax(b2) we immediately deduce that p()  0 and that
PN
n=1 pn() =








































+ (1   )
























b1 + (1   )b2
2
= b(): (23)
By Eq. (23) and the observations immediately preceding it we can conclude that p() is feasible













= Vmax(b1) + (1   )Vmax(b2);
22where the last equality follows from the assumed optimality of pmax(b1) and pmax(b2). We now
proceed to show continuity. By concavity Vmax(b) will be continuous on the open interval (0; N 1
N )
so we need only consider the endpoints 0 and N 1
N . Since Vmax(b) is increasing in b we must have
limb!( N 1
N )  Vmax(b)  Vmax(N 1
N ). However, if limb!( N 1
N )  Vmax(b) < Vmax(N 1
N ) then we reach
a contradiction if we apply concavity to (N   1)=N and other values of b.
To prove continuity at b = 0 consider an  > 0. Now let  > 0 and write










































Thus, any choice of 0 <  < 2
(maxn2N junj)2 will ensure that jVmax() Vmax(0)j < , completing the
proof.
Lemma 1. The function Vmax(b) is bounded above by un for any n 2 NN(r). This upper bound
is attained by a probability vector p if and only if it satises
X
n2 b N
pn = 1; for some c N  NN(r)
Consider a subset c N  NN(r), with cardinality b N. Eq. (4) implies that the value of b at which it
rst becomes possible to assign probability 1 to subset c N is given by







The minimizer of b( b N;N) over c N  NN(r) is the entire set NN(r), yielding the desired result.
Now consider b < b
max and the optimal solution pmax(b). As b < b
max there must exist
a j 6= NN(r) such that pmax
j (b) > 0. Now consider increasing b by an amount . For  > 0
small enough the solution ~ p which is identical to pmax(b) except that ~ pj = pmax
j (b)    and
~ pk = pmax
k (b)+ for some k 2 NN(r) will be feasible and result in a strictly greater objective value,
so that Vmax(b + ) > Vmax(b). Equivalent reasoning applies to the Vmin case.
Proposition 2. Suppose rst that b = b
max. It is clear here that the unique optimal solution is
given by pmax such that pmax
n = 1=NN(r) for all n 2 NN(r) and pmax
n = 0 otherwise. The quadratic
ambiguity constraint binds by the denition of b
max.
23Consider now the case b < b
max and suppose there exists an optimal solution pmax(b) such
that the quadratic ambiguity constraint is slack. As b < b
max there must exist an j 6= NN(r)
such that pmax
j (b) > 0. For  > 0 small enough the solution ~ pmax in which ~ pj = pmax
j (b)   
and ~ pk = pmax
k (b) +  for some k 2 NN(r) will be feasible and result in a strictly greater objective
value, contradicting pmax(b)'s optimality. Thus, all optimal solutions must satisfy the quadratic
ambiguity constraint with equality.
We now prove uniqueness. Suppose there exist two optimal solutions pmax;1 and pmax;2. By
the preceding argument they must bind the quadratic ambiguity constraint. Consider the set of
probability vectors given by their convex combinations
p() = pmax;1 + (1   )pmax;2;  2 [0;1]:































































= b + (1   )b = b:
Thus all solutions p() are feasible. That they are optimal follows trivially by the assumed opti-
mality of pmax;1;pmax;2 and the linear objective function of (9). But this is a contradiction as all
optimal solutions must satisfy the quadratic ambiguity constraint with equality. The second claim
of the Proposition regarding b > bmax is trivial.
Theorem 1. We prove the result for Vmax; the argument for Vmin is analogous. To do so we
need to invoke results from conic duality. We begin with part (a). Given x = (x0; x) 2 <n+1 we
introduce the following notation to denote inclusion in a second-order cone of dimension n + 1
(x0; x) 2 L2
n+1 , x0  jj xjj2:
We follow Alizadeh and Goldfarb [2] to write (9) as a primal conic program P(b) and introduce its






s.t.  pn + qn = 0; 8n 2 N; (yn)
N X
n=1
 pn =  1; (y0)



















s.t.  y0   yn + zpn =  un; 8n 2 N
yn + zqn = 0; 8n 2 N
n + zn = 0; 8n 2 N
D(b)  0 + zq0 = 0
(zpn;zn) 2 L2
2; 8n 2 N
(zq0; zq) 2 L2
n+1:
Since both the primal and the dual have feasible strictly interior solutions, strong duality holds
(see Theorem 13 of [2]). Without loss of generality, we can immediately simplify D(b) by setting
z =  = 0 and zp  0. Correspondingly, we can eliminate the variable zq by replacing it with








n. Collecting all of these observations we may re-write














s.t.  un + y0 + yn  0; n = 1;2;:::;N: (24)
Examining (24) we deduce that at optimality y
n = max(0;un y0). Thus we may simplify the dual












max(0;un   y0)2: (25)
By strong duality the dual optimal objective will be bounded between 1
N
PN
n=1 un and u(N(r)). We
immediately see that solutions satisfying y0 > u(N(r)) result in strictly greater objective function
values than y0 = u(N(r)), so that we can safely disregard them. Conversely, solutions satisfying






















Nb + 1(ju(1)j   y0) =
p
Nb + 1ju(1)j + y0(1  
p
Nb + 1):




Nb+1 result in a strictly greater objective function value than y0 = u(N(r))



















max(0;un   y0)2 (26)
The domain of D3(b) is thus compact, for any b > 0. For values of b 2 [0;b
max) we know that the
optimal solution of the primal will be strictly less than u(N(r)). Thus, strong duality implies that
for all b 2 (0;b
max), any optimal solution y(b) must satisfy y(b) < u(N(r) 1). However, notice
that the objective function of D3 is strictly convex for y0 < u(N(r) 1). Thus, we may deduce that
when b 2 (0;b
max) D3(b) admits a unique optimal solution y
0(b).
The above observation implies that we can apply Danskin's theorem (see Proposition B.25 in
Bertsekas [6]) to conclude that the optimal dual objective value, and therefore by strong duality












; b 2 (0;b
max): (27)
Before we proceed with investigating the endpoints b = 0 and bmax, we show that y
0(b) is
strictly increasing in b 2 (0;b




0(b2). By uniqueness of y























































































0(b2))2 > 0 ) y
0(b2) > y
0(b1):
We discuss now the dierentiability of Vmax at b 2 f0;b
maxg. At b = 0 the domain of (26) is
no longer bounded below and therefore we can no longer invoke Danskin's theorem. Consequently,






















The strict monotonicity of y(b) and H older's inequality imply that limb!0+ y(b) < 0. Subse-














If we take squares now on both sides and re-apply H older's inequality, we see that
lim





Now we consider b = b
max. Note that the optimal solution y
0(b
max) is not unique; instead it
can take any value in the interval [u(N(r) 1);u(N(r))]. Hence Danskin's theorem implies that the
subdierential of Vmax(b) at b









We now prove part (b). Let us go back to the original primal-dual pair (P(b);D(b)) and
consider a pair of optimal solutions of the primal and dual problems. By Proposition 2 the primal
optimal solution (p(b);q(b);(b);q
0(b)) is unique, while our reasoning in part (a) established





16 and part (ii) of the complementarity conditions of Lemma 15 of Alizadeh and Goldfarb [2], we
































n(b) = 0; n = 1;2;:::;N: (28)
When b < b
max, strong duality implies y




0(b))2 > 0. As mentioned earlier, when b = b
max y
0(b) can take any value in [u(N(r) 1);u(N(r))]
so we choose one that again yields
PN
n=1 max(0;un   y
0(b
max))2 > 0. Hence, the complementarity
conditions (28) yield
p
n(b) = 0 , un   y
0(b)  0; n = 1;2;:::;N: (29)
27Since y
0(b) is strictly increasing in b in (0;b
max) and limb!0+ y
0(b) =  1 and limb!b
max  y(b) =
u(N(r) 1), Eq. (29) implies the existence of a set fb1;b2;:::;bN(r) 1g such that
0 < b1 < b2 < :::: < bN(r) 1 = b
max n
p
n(b) = 0 8n 2 N  
k
o
, b  bk

; 8k = 1;2;:::;N(r)   1:
Proposition 3. We prove the result for Vmax; the argument for Vmin is analogous. Focusing on








+  + n = 0; n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng (30)





















pn = 1; p  0 (32)
npn = 0; n  0; n 2 f1;2;:::;Ng: (33)
Since our problem is concave with ane equality constraints and satises Slater's condition (see
section 5.2.3 in [9]), strong duality holds and the KKT conditions (30)-(33) will be necessary and
sucient for both primal and dual optimality. In other words, the duality gap is zero and the
vector (p;;;) satises (30)-(33) if and only p and ;; are primal and dual optimal
respectively (see section 5.5.3 in [9]).
From Proposition 2 we know that there exists a unique primal optimal solution p. By strong
duality, the Lagrangean dual problem admits an optimal solution, and we refer to it by ;;.14
Since Vmax(b) is dierentiable (Theorem 1) and strong duality holds we follow Section 5.6.3 in Boyd
and Vandenberghe [9] to deduce the following simple relation:
d
db
Vmax(b) = max(b); b 2 (0;b
max): (34)
Eq. (34) means that we can now focus on calculating the Lagrange multiplier max(b). Before we































14Note that at this point one can manipulate the KKT conditions (30)-(33) to show that the Lagrangean dual's













Multiplying both sides of Eq. (30) by pmax


































+ max(b) = 0





Now we consider Eq. (30) for expert nk 2 Nk. By part (b) of Theorem 1 we must have pmax
nk (b) > 0
if and only if b 2 [0;bmax
k ). Substituting the value of max(b) obtained in Eq. (36), and applying

























= unk   Vmax(b); b 2 (0;bmax
k ): (37)
Theorem 2. We focus on Vmax; the argument for Vmin is symmetric. Recall the denition of
bmax
k of Eq. (11). Consider rst b 2 (0;bmax
1 ) so that pmax
n (b) > 0 for all b 2 (0;bmax
1 ) and n 2 N.







un; b 2 (0;bmax
1 ): (38)








; b 2 [0;bmax
1 ); (39)
where Cmax
1 is a constant to be determined. Consider now b 2 [bmax
k 1;bmax
k ) for k 2 f2;3;:::;N(r) 
1g. In this range of b we will have pmax
n (b) > 0 if and only n 2 N +
k . Adding Eqs. (37) for all such
n 2 N +
















k Vmax(b); b 2 [bmax
k 1;bmax
k ) (40)
















for k 2 f2;3;:::;N(r)   1g, where Cmax
k is a constant to determined. Finally since bmax
N(r) 1 = b
max











Putting together Eqs. (39), (41), and (42) we see that Vmax will equal
Vmax(b) =
8
> > > > <






















; k = 2;3;:::;N(r)   1


















Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, Vmax is continuous everywhere and dierentiable everywhere at
(0; N 1
N ) except b










must fulll these criteria of continuity and dierentiability and are thus uniquely determined by
the following system of nonlinear equations (44)-(51):














































































































































, where the latter are given by Eqs. (16). We begin with Case 1 and N(r) = 2. That
bmax
1 = b+













We now focus on Case 2 and N(r)  3. Once again, bmax
N(r) 1 = b+



































































A =  u+
k    u+
k+1: (53)




































































































which after some simple algebra leads to the following nonhomogeneous linear recursion for the




























; k = 2;3;:::;N(r)   2: (57)














taking square roots, and recalling the positive sign of the Cmax
k 's, establishes that Cmax
k = C+
k for
k = 2;3;:::;N(r) 2. Subsequently applying Eq. (56) establishes bmax
k = b+





k is obtained by applying Cmax
2 = C+
2 to Eq. (47) and solving
Eqs. (46) and (47) for bmax
1 and Cmax
1 .
Corollary 1: Characterization of Pmax(r;b) and Pmin(r;b). We distinguish between dierent
cases.
1. Pmax(r;b).
Case (1a): b < b+
N(r) 1(r). In this case, by Proposition 2, we know that the optimal solution




dened in Eqs. (16). Suppose expert




> > > > > > <





































Case (1b): b  b+
N(r) 1(r). Here, by Proposition 2 all vectors pmax(r;b) satisfying pmax
n (r;b) = 0











N2 will be optimal. This set is a
singleton at b = b+
N(r) 1(r).
2. Pmin(r;b).
Case (2a): b < b 
N(r) 1(r). In this case, by Proposition 2, we know that the optimal solution




dened in Eqs. (17). Suppose





> > > > > > > <






































Case (2b): b  b 
N(r) 1(r). Here, by Proposition 2 all vectors pmin(r;b) satisfying pmin
n (r;b) = 0











N2 will be optimal. This set is a singleton
at b = b 
N(r) 1(r).
Theorem 3. Here we apply part (iii) of Corollary 4 in Milgrom and Segal [26] to functions
Vmax(rjb) and Vmin(rjb) (we express the latter as a maximization problem  Vmax( rjb)).
Corollary 2. Follows by Proposition 2 and Theorem 3.
Proposition 4. Follows from Proposition 2 and Theorem 3.
Corollary 3. The statement of the Corollary implies that NN(r)(r) = fn1g and N1(r) = fn2g for
all r 2 R. Hence, b
max(r) = b
min(r) = N 1
N for all r 2 [rm;rM]. Applying Corollary 2 establishes
the result.
33A2: Constructing expert pdfs for the three R&D Scenarios from ICARUS survey
data
In the ICARUS survey, experts were asked to provide values for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile
of their distributions for the 2030 cost of solar technology conditional on all three Scenarios. In
addition, they were asked to provide values for the probability of this cost being less than or equal
to the following three values: 11.3, 5.5, and 3c$/kWh. These \threshold" cost levels correspond to
projections of the costs of electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear in 2030. The rst (11.27 c$/kWh)
corresponds to the 2030 projected cost of electricity from traditional coal power plants in the
presence of a specic policy to control CO2 emissions (thus eectively doubling electricity costs
from fossil sources). The second threshold cost (5.5 c$/kWh) is the projected cost of electricity
from traditional fossil fuels in 2030, without considering any carbon tax. Finally, the third (3
c$/kWh) reects a situation in which solar power becomes competitive with the levelized cost of
electricity from nuclear power.
Asking experts the follow up question on the likelihood of reaching threshold cost targets
allowed the survey authors to guard against the cognitive pitfalls associated with direct elicitation of
subjective probabilities, to increase the amount of elicited information, and to deepen the discussion
with the expert, hence improving their perception of his/her beliefs. In cases where the two sets of
answers (percentile values and threshold probabilities) were inconsistent, we contacted the expert
in order to obtain coherent estimates. Moreover, we asked all experts to give values for the upper
and lower limits of their distribution's support in order to pinpoint the intervals over which their
implied probability distributions range.
Such corrected estimates were obtained from 14 out of the original 16 experts, and therefore
the analysis of Section 4 focuses solely on them. Among the respondents, not all provided values on
the left and right endpoints of their distributions' support. As a result, we deduced between 6 and 8
points of 14 experts' cumulative distribution functions (cdf) of the 2030 cost of solar electricity, given
the aforementioned three R&D investment Scenarios. From these points a probability distribution
function (pdf) was constructed using linear interpolation in the following way. First of all, and in
accordance with the experts' answers, we considered cost levels c lying in [2c$/kWh, 30c$/kWh]
and discretized this interval on a scale of 0.5 (30c$/kWh represents an estimate of the technology's
current cost). Now, suppose an expert reported the values of his/her cdf Fn at two successive
points c1 and c2 where c2 > c1 and gave no further information on cost levels between c1 and c2.
Assuming right-continuity of Fn we took the probability mass Fn(c2)   Fn(c1) to be distributed
uniformly among the cost levels fc1 + :5;c1 + 1;:::;c2g. For experts who did not provide values for
34the lower limit of their distribution's support we assumed that whatever probability mass remained
to be allocated (always less than .1) was distributed uniformly between the smallest argument of
the cdf and two cost levels below it. For example, if an expert only indicated that cl was his y'th
percentile and gave no further points of the cdf below this, we assumed that a probability mass
of y was distributed evenly across fcl   1;cl   :5;clg. In the case of an unknown upper limit, if
an expert only indicated that cu was his yth percentile and gave no further arguments for the cdf
above it, we assumed that a probability mass of 1 y was distributed evenly across fcu+:5;cu+1g.
Following this procedure we arrived at probability distribution functions for all 14 experts
conditional on all three Scenarios. The implied cumulative distribution functions are depicted in
Figure 1.
35A3: Tables and Figures
2030 solar-technology cost c Benet B(c)















Table 1: EU discounted consumption improvement as a function of 2030 solar-power cost




Table 2: Discounted opportunity cost of R&D Scenarios








Panel a: Scenario 1








Panel b: Scenario 2

























Figure 1: Expert and aggregate cdfs of the 2030 cost of solar technology under the three R&D Sce-
narios. Recall that the cdf's domain is f2;2:5;:::;29;29:5;30g. Cost is measured in 2005 USc$/kWh.













Figure 2: Worst and Best-Case net payos (benets minus opportunity cost) for the three R&D
scenarios. Net payos are measured in US$109.
38Figure 3: Net payo (benets minus opportunity cost) for the three R&D scenarios, as a function














Figure 4: Comparison of the three scenarios over all values of b and . A
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